Towards GMO-free landscapes? Identifying driving factors for the establishment of cooperative GMO-free zones in Germany by Consmuller, Nicola et al.
Towards GMO-free landscapes? Identifying driving factors for the 




2, and Martin Petrick
3 
nicola.consmueller@agrar.hu-berlin.de 
1 Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Division of Resource Economics, 
Germany 
2 Ernst-Moritz-Arndt Universität Greifswald, Department of Landscape 
Economics, Germany 
3 Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern 















Copyright 2011 by authors. All rights reserved. Readers may make verbatim copies 
of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this 
copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
Vortrag anlässlich der 51. Jahrestagung der GEWISOLA 
„Unternehmerische Landwirtschaft zwischen Marktanforderungen und 
gesellschaftlichen Erwartungen“ 
Halle, 28. bis 30. September 2011 
 2 
TOWARDS GMO-FREE LANDSCAPES? IDENTIFYING DRIVING FACTORS FOR THE 




2, and Martin Petrick
3 
Abstract 
Since  the  end  of  the  quasi-moratorium  on  genetically  modified  organisms  (GMO)  in  the 
European Union in 2004, the establishment of GMO-free zones has become an EU wide 
phenomenon.  In  contrast  to  other  European  countries,  Germany  follows  the  concept  of 
cooperative GMO-free zones where neighbouring farmers contractually refrain from GMO 
cultivation. In this article, we address the question which underlying factors could account for 
the  establishment  of  cooperative  GMO-free  zones  in  Germany.  Drawing  on  the  existing 
literature  on  spatial  agglomeration  of  different  farming  systems  and  the  establishment  of 
GMO-free zones, we provide the first systematic study on driving factors for the regional 
formation of GMO-free zones in Germany. The empirical analysis is based on a unique data 
set at the federal states level for the years 2004 to 2007. We show that infestation rates with 
the European Corn Borer, imminent Bt maize cultivation in the near vicinity and the number 
of arriving tourists mainly account for the establishment of cooperative GMO-free zones. This 
finding is consistent with the view that it is more the overall rejection of agro-biotechnology 
by  broad  strata  of  the  population,  including  stakeholders  in  tourism  and  environmental 
protection, than economic benefits at the farm level which make German regions establish 
GMO-free zones. 
Keywords: Genetically modified organisms (GMO), GMO-free zone, econometric analysis, 
Germany. 
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1  Introduction 
After the end of the quasi-moratorium on GM (genetically modified) crops in Europe in 2004, 
all European Union (EU) member states have been confronted with imminent cultivation of 
these  crops.  Probably  fuelled  by  the  ongoing  public  debate  about  potential  negative  side 
effects of GM plants, such as cross-pollination or admixture of GM material, a remarkable 
phenomenon  of  collective  action  has  since  emerged  in  many  member  states:  farmers  and 
citizens declare that large tracts of land in a specifically designated region are supposed to be 
free of any GM organisms. The formation of such GMO-free zones has been observed in 
almost every EU member state. By the year 2011, Denmark, the Netherlands and the Czech 
Republic were the only member states of the EU with no such initiative (GMO-free regions, 
2011). But what were the reasons for the widespread creation of these zones? Is it more an 
abstract rejection of agro biotechnology or is there an economic rationale for farmers or other 
stakeholders to publicly refrain from cultivating GM crops? Which role plays the regional 
importance of the target pest of GM crops? Who are the key actors in establishing GMO-free 
zones? These questions are addressed in the following both theoretically and empirically in 
the German context of GM crop cultivation and GM-free zones.  
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As  the  establishment  of  GMO-free  regions  is  a  rather  recent  phenomenon,  the  academic 
literature  analysing  it  is  still  in  its  infancy.  Contributions  so  far  have  mostly  focused  on 
aspects of risk control and reducing the costs of coexistence. Another issue to clarify is who 
are the key actors in establishing these regions. In two early publications, Schermer (2001) 
and Schermer and Hoppichler (2004) conceptualize a GMO-free zone as an alternative path of 
development  under  scientific  uncertainty  with  a  high  relevance  for  ecologically  sensitive 
areas. This concept is mainly linked to the perception that the cultivation of GM crops poses 
unpredictable  risks  to  human  health  or  the  environment  which  can  only  be  controlled  by 
defining  areas  of  no-contamination.  However,  not  only  risk  aspects  matter  when 
conceptualizing a GMO-free zone. The European Guidelines on Coexistence (CEC, 2003) 
prescribe  the  freedom  of  choice  for  farmers  and  consumers  to  select  between  the  three 
different  agricultural  production  systems,  such  as  organic,  conventional  and  GM.  Spatial 
agglomeration  of  production  systems,  e.g.  by  establishing  a  GMO-free  zone,  can  thus  be 
regarded as one possible measure to implement regional coexistence. Beckmann et al. (2006) 
have developed a model to explain regional agglomeration effects under irreversibility and 
uncertainty. It shows that the rules linked to GM crop cultivation result in incentives for the 
GM  farmer  to  collaborate  with  his  neighbours  in  order  to  reduce  the  costs  of  ex-ante 
regulation and ex-post liability, which might result in spatially coherent areas of different 
production  systems.  Alternatively,  by  forming  a  landscape  club  with  a  joint  buffer  zone, 
organic farmers could protect themselves from negative externalities of GM crop cultivation 
nearby and increase the welfare for both organic and GM farmers in this geographic region 
(Furtan et al. 2007). According to Beckmann and Schleyer (2007), a necessary precondition 
for  the  establishment  of  a  cooperative  GMO-free  zone  is  the  perception  of  the  involved 
farmers about the benefits of GMO-free production. Benefits from adopting GM crops are 
perceived  as  being  low,  where  the  ECB  is  of  minor  importance  and  organic  farming  is 
widespread.  Since  cooperation  is  cost-intensive,  additional  benefits  must  arise  from  the 
formation of a GMO-free zone which compensates the costs of collective action. The authors 
assume that these additional benefits from cooperation mainly arise from the reduction of 
(legal) uncertainty, the avoidance of law suits among neighbouring farmers and marketing 
advantages of GMO-free products or market disadvantages because of GM crop production. 
While  these  theoretical  considerations  seem  plausible,  empirical  evidence  on  the  factors 
influencing  the  establishment  of  GMO-free  zones  is  scarce.  The  only  study  on  the 
determinants of  establishing GMO-free zones in Germany so far has  been carried out by 
Nischwitz et al. (2005). They also address the important question of who actually initiates 
these zones. According to their study, the establishment of GMO-free zones is mainly due to 
local  farmers,  for  the  most  part  organic  farmers.  Beyond  that,  farmers’  associations  and 
agricultural producer groups engage in the formation. Bottom-up processes have been proven 
to be more successful than top-down processes. Expert interviews carried out by the authors 
revealed  that  the  main  reason  for  the  establishment  of  GMO-free  zones  was  the  general 
rejection of agricultural biotechnology by the involved stakeholders. Moreover, the authors 
mention factors like safeguarding organic production, avoiding disputes among neighbouring 
farmers or image benefits for the region. Undoubtedly, GMO-free zones can also be perceived 
as a response of local actors to an insufficient regulation of GM crop cultivation (Nischwitz et 
al., 2005, p. 63).  
Against this background, the current study is the first to pursue a systematic quantitative 
analysis of the determinants of establishing GMO-free zones in Germany. After outlining 
their development and the legal framework for their establishment, we present three groups of 
factors that are likely to influence the creation of GMO-free zones. These are low opportunity 
costs for participating farmers, increased benefits from joining a GMO-free zone, and factors 
reducing the cost of collective action. These factors are then made operational and tested in an 






























































































aggregated  information  about  the  area  under  GMO-free  zones  and  various  structural  and 
socioeconomic  variables  for  the  years  2004  to  2007.  We  use  fixed  effects  techniques  to 
eliminate unobserved heterogeneity among regions. Our findings suggest that imminent or 
actual  Bt  maize  cultivation  were  main  drivers  of  collective  action  to  establish  GMO-free 
zones. Local actors were apparently trying to halt undesired landscape changes by collective 
action where and when Bt maize area expansion was in the offing. While our findings are 
consistent with the view that farmers were the ones most interested in establishing GMO-free 
zones, the variables measuring coexistence costs (such as the presence of organic farms or 
average farm size) did not turn out to have a significant influence. However, the importance 
of tourism had a significantly positive effect on GMO-free zone creation, pointing at the 
importance of GMO freeness for the positive image of a region. This finding implies that the 
regional economy in general, and its stakeholders, represent an additional important factor in 
understanding GMO free zones. The fact that the presence of German Friends of the Earth in 
a given region favours the establishment – although only with weak statistical significance – 
lends further support to this idea. 
The article is structured as follows. In sections two and three, we give an historic overview on 
the development of GMO-free zones in Germany and the forms of contract which can lead to 
GMO-free  agriculture.  We  then  theoretically  derive  factors  which  could  account  for  a 
cooperative formation of GMO-free zones in the fourth section. In section five we apply an 
econometric model to test the influence of these factors on the establishment of GMO-free 
zones in Germany.  Section six presents the results, and the final section concludes. 
2  History and development of GMO-free zones in Germany  
In Germany, the active engagement of 29,836 farmers and other stakeholders has led to the 
foundation  of  over  200  cooperative  GMO-free  zones  until  the  year  2010.  According  to 
Nischwitz et al. (2005), a voluntary GMO-free zone is an important measure to ensure GMO-
free production and does not contradict current European regulation. In past years, German 
GMO-free zones showed a high temporal and spatial dynamic. The first GMO-free zone was 
founded  in  Mecklenburg-Western  Pomerania  in  2003.  In  2004,  the  number  of  GMO-free 
zones  had  already  increased  up  to  56,  covering  659,653  ha  of  agricultural  land.  In  the 
following years, more and more farmers throughout Germany engaged in GMO-free zones 
(Gentechnikfreie Regionen, 2011). Detailed numbers for the years 2003 to 2010 are displayed 







Figure 1 and 2 Number of GMO-free zones and land coverage in ha per year (Source : Gentechnikfreie 
Regionen, 2011) 
Cooperative GMO-free zones are not equally distributed among the German federal states. 
According to the  German platform on GMO-free zones,  Bavaria was leading in size  and 
numbers of GMO-free zones with 49 zones covering a total of 501,755 ha agricultural land  
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(average  size:  10,240  ha)  in  2007,  followed  by  Baden-Wuerttemberg  with  27  zones  and 
139,622  ha  (average  size:  5,171  ha).  Generally  low  dynamics  can  be  observed  from  the 
Eastern and Northern German states. In Brandenburg, five GMO-free zones covered an area 
of 86,000 ha in 2007 (average size: 17,200 ha), followed by Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
with eight zones and 57,566 ha (average size: 7,196), Saxony-Anhalt with five zones and 
28,122 ha (average size: 5,624 ha), Saxony with three zones and 15,580 ha (average size: 
5,193 ha) and Thuringia with only one GMO-free zone on 2,400 ha. Schleswig-Holstein and 
Lower Saxony are also characterized by a moderate development of GMO-free zones: Until 
2007, only three zones were founded in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, covering an 
area of 9,000 ha (average size: 3,000 ha) and 1,729 ha (average size: 575 ha). Saarland is the 
only  German  federal  state  where  no  GMO-free  zone  has  been  established  so  far 
(Gentechnikfreie Regionen, 2011). 
The German platform on GMO-free regions defines a GMO-free zone as “an area where 
owners, users and cultivators of agricultural land consciously do not make use of genetically 
modified crops”. In some but not all cases, farmers may also renounce from using GM fodder 
but there is not a general obligation to do so. One central criterion for a GMO-free zone is its 
spatial coherence: “a GMO-free zone must consist of a coherent production area” or “at least 
2/3 of the agricultural production area of a defined locality, e.g. a municipality, county etc., 
must be cultivated without using GMO”. Those areas which do not yet fulfil the criteria of a 
GMO-free  zone  can  call  themselves  an  “initiative  to  a  GMO-free  zone”  (Gentechnikfreie 
Regionen, 2011). 
3  Legal framework for the establishment of GMO-free zones in the EU and in 
Germany 
In  2003,  the  European  Commission  published  guideline  2003/556/EC  on  coexistence  of 
genetically  modified  crops  with  conventional  and  organic  farming.  According  to  the 
recommendation,  freedom  of  choice  regarding  the  different  production  systems  shall  be 
guaranteed  to  farmers  as  well  as  consumers.  Cooperation  among  neighbouring  farmers  is 
explicitly  mentioned  as  one  tool  to  guarantee  coexistence.  Beyond  that,  “[…]  Groups  of 
farmers in a neighbourhood may achieve a significant reduction in the costs related to the 
segregation of GM and non-GM production types if they coordinate their production on the 
basis of voluntary agreements […]” (CEC, 2003). 
The concept of cooperative GMO-free zones, as practiced in Germany, is also in line with the 
current EU regulation 2001/18/EC on deliberate release of GMO (EEC, 2001). According to 
Directive  2001/18/EC,  GM  crops  which  hold  a  positive  approval  by  the  European  Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) must not be generally prohibited at the member states level. The 
only way to utter a national ban on a certain GM event is to present new scientific evidence 
which indicate a not yet considered risk of the crop. In this case, the member state can invoke 
the so called safeguard clause according to Article 23 of Directive 2001/18/EC. This has been 
done  by  several  countries  in  the  past,  such  as  Austria  in  1999,  followed  by  Greece  and 
Hungary in 2006, France in 2007 and Luxemburg and Germany in 2009, although EFSA 
could not support the member state decision scientifically. 
Only recently, the European Parliament facilitated the procedure of national GMO cultivation 
bans by approving a proposal made by the European Commission. Bans on approved GM 
crop events are now legally possible for environmental, socio-economic or land use reasons 
(ISAAA, 2011).  
Besides a general ban on GM crop cultivation, GMO-freeness in agricultural production can 
be governed by different organization forms, which can differ in their contractual design and 
legal character. All of the below mentioned contract types are present in Germany. 
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Voluntary agreements among farmers: 
The governance of GMO-freeness can be based on voluntary agreements among neighbouring 
farms. This concept is the core element of cooperative GMO-free zones in Germany. Every 
farmer is free to decide whether to sign a voluntary agreement or not. With this agreement the 
farmer obligates himself to refrain from the use of GM seeds in agricultural crop production. 
In some cases, GMO-freeness might also apply to animal feeding, but this is not necessarily 
prescribed. Generally, the agreements are valid for one year and are prolonged automatically 
if  not  otherwise  stated.  These  voluntary  agreements  range  from  a  single  farm  to  a  large 
coherent area, involving up to several hundred farmers. In this case, actors do not take their 
decisions individually but collectively. A voluntary agreement for a cooperative GMO-free 
zone has no legally binding character. This is apparent since it lacks measures of monitoring 
or sanctioning in case of noncompliance or exit. 
 
Contract farming: 
GMO-freeness in agricultural production can also be achieved by contract farming, where the 
use of GM seed or GM fodder is contractually prohibited. In Germany, many food processing 
companies such as mills and dairies have already obliged their suppliers to produce without 
GMO.  Recently,  the  large  discounter  Lidl  announced  to  sell  regional  dairy  products  in 
Bavaria which are GMO-free. Farmers, who produce milk for Lidl have to declare not to use 
GM fodder (Der Spiegel, 2011). The largest mill in Germany, Kampffmeyer, also prescribes 
GMO-freeness in their delivery contract (Kampffmeyer, 2010). 
  
Tenancy agreements: 
In Germany, many landowners have forbidden the use of GM material on their land through 
tenancy agreements. This is especially true for landowning municipalities and the Protestant 
Church of Germany (Evangelische Kirche Deutschland). Beyond that, different stakeholder 
groups have encouraged private landowners to prohibit the cultivation of GM crops on their 
land (Greenpeace, 2005). A legal opinion launched by Greenpeace Germany in 2008 comes to 
the conclusion that German law provides room to fix the ban in a tenancy agreement. In the 
case  of  tenancy  agreements,  possible  noncompliance  with  contract  conditions  can  be 
monitored and sanctioned. 
After  this  short  overview  on  the  development  of  GMO-free  zones  in  Germany  and  the 
contractual  design  to  govern  GMO-freeness,  the  next  section  focuses  on  the  theoretical 
foundations of the establishment of cooperative GMO-free zones. 
4  Factors determining the establishment of GMO-free zones  
The cultivation of GM crops can lead to spatial externalities (Munro, 2008), mainly caused by 
the probability of cross-pollination between GM crops and adjacent non-GM crops. As laid 
down in the German Act on Genetic Engineering (Gentechnikgesetz, GenTG), the property 
rights are assigned to the non-GM farmer. Accordingly, the GM farmer has to take measures 
of ex-ante regulation to reduce the probability of cross-pollination to neighbouring fields and 
is ex-post liable for damages to third parties (Consmüller et al., 2009). From this regulation, 
coexistence costs for the GM-farmer may arise. However, also the non-GM farmer can be 
confronted  with  costs  for  e.g.  laboratory  analyses  to  prove  the  GMO-free  status  of  his 
products which are not refunded (Then and Lorch, 2009). According to Jank et al. (2006), a 
significant reduction of these costs can be achieved if the two production types are spatially 
segregated into zones of GM-crop production and zones of GMO-free production. Skevas et 
al.  2010  could  demonstrate  that  cooperation  among  GM  farmers  in  Portugal  significantly 
reduces coexistence costs. The same holds true for GMO-free production. Pirscher (2006)  
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refers to damage costs which constitute the main incentive for the formation of GMO-free 
zones. Beyond that, laboratory costs for GM analyses or the costs of keeping retain samples 
may arise to the non-GM farmer to prove the purity of his product (Bullock and Desquilbet, 
2000). Therefore, spatial agglomeration for GMO-free production might also act as a cost 
reducing approach under certain preconditions. 
Against  this  background,  we  turn  to  the  theoretical  question  which  factors  could  have 
influenced regional formation cooperative GMO-free zones in Germany from 2004 to 2007. 
Bt maize MON810 received market approval in the EU in 1998. Therefore, also in Germany, 
deliberate releases were pending, which resulted in temporal cultivation from 2005 to 2008. 
Hence, a German conventional farmer could take the decision whether to switch to Bt maize 
or not. In economic terms, this decision depends on inner-farm cost-benefit calculations but is 
also influenced by external factors as could be demonstrated by Consmüller et al. (2010). 
Under  the  German  regulatory  framework,  regional  adoption  of  Bt  maize  in  Germany  is 
positively linked to ECB occurrence and size of the maize fields. The number of BUND
1 
members, on the contrary, had a negative influence on adoption rates. Theoretically, a farmer 
can also decide not to grow GM crops at all. This may be driven by the fact that he produces 
organically which does not allow him to switch. Beyond that, he might reject the cultivation 
of GM crops for personal reasons. The establishment of GMO-free zones, however, is an act 
of collective action and thus necessarily involves more than just one farmer. The decision to 
form a GMO-free zone thus needs coordination with adjacent farmers in order to establish a 
spatially coherent area of GMO-free agricultural production. 
As statistics on the cultivation of Bt maize in Germany reveal, only a very small percentage of 
German farmers actually adopted Bt maize (Consmüller et al. 2010). 
A necessary precondition for the spatial formation of a GMO-free zone is low opportunity 
costs of not switching to Bt maize. This is mainly the case for organic farmers, who are not 
allowed to grow GM crops at all. Beyond that, Bt maize adoption is unattractive in those 
regions  where  either  maize  production  is  of  minor  importance  and  the  target  pest,  the 
European Corn Borer, only causes minor to no damages. In addition, the collective action of 
forming  a  GMO-free  zone  can  directly  be  linked  to  increased  benefits  for  the  involved 
farmers. Benefits mainly arise where farmers rejecting GM crops face a high probability of 
damages  either by imminent Bt maize cultivation in the vicinity or due to small structured 
agriculture which renders the implementation of coexistence measures more difficult and less 
effective  (Pirscher,  2006).  Furthermore,  a  GMO-free  zone  might  be  able  to  increase  the 
attractiveness of a region for tourists. Collective action to form a GMO-free zone is cost 
intensive, since for instance, adjacent neighbours have to be convinced to join the initiative 
and meetings have to be organised to maintain the structure. Certain actors can positively 
influence the cost dimension by providing infrastructure or help. 
We take these considerations as a starting point for the deduction of suitable parameters for 
our econometric analysis and describe them in further detail below. 
Category I: Low opportunity costs to participate in a GMO-free zone 
Organic farming 
According to Beckmann and Schleyer (2007), the share of organic farms in a region could be 
an indicator for the beneficial establishment of a GMO-free zone. Organic farmers have no 
incentives  to  grow  Bt  maize  because  it  is  not  allowed  to  make  use  of  GM  technology. 
Therefore, opportunity costs to join a GMO-free zone are very low. In Germany, the labelling 
threshold of 0.9% for adventitious and technically unavoidable GMO traces also applies to 
organic production. However, many firms prescribe a labelling threshold of 0.1% which leads 
to additional costs of monitoring, if Bt maize cultivation takes place nearby. Therefore, for 
                                                 
1 BUND abbreviates Bund für Naturschutz Deutschland (Friends of the Earth Germany). 8 
organic farmers high incentives exist to join a GMO-free zone in order to reduce potential on-
farm coexistence costs which are not covered by the legislatory framework. We therefore 
argue  that  in  regions  with  a  high  percentage  of  organic  farms,  there  is  also  a  higher 
probability for the establishment of GMO-free zones. 
Maize area per farm 
In line with the argumentation of Beckmann and Schleyer (2007) we assume that opportunity 
costs of joining a GMO-free zone are also reduced if maize area per farm is low. Neither is 
the occurrence of the ECB problematic in this case nor is there an incentive to switch to Bt 
maize production. Therefore, we expect the establishment of GMO-free zones in those areas 
where maize production is generally of minor importance. 
Dynamics of the European Corn Borer (Ostrinia nubilalis Hübn.) 
As  could  be  demonstrated  by  Consmüller  et  al.  (2010),  regional  Bt  maize  cultivation  in 
Germany is positively correlated with the occurrence of the target pest, the European Corn 
Borer. This is not surprising since Bt maize functions as a plant protectant against the larvae 
of this maize pest. High infestation rates have been reported from southern parts of Germany, 
e.g. Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg (Degenhardt et al., 2003). However, in recent years, 
the pest has been spreading northwards, with the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein being the 
last one in Germany with only minor to no incidence. Some areas are known for especially 
high infestation rates, such as the Franken region in northern Bavaria  and the Oderbruch 
region in eastern Brandenburg (Schröder et al. 2006). With regards to the formation of GMO-
free zones, Beckmann and Schleyer (2007) pointed out that these are likely to be established 
in regions where the European Corn Borer is only of minor importance because growing Bt 
maize not economically reasonable.  
Category II: Increased benefits from joining a GMO-free zone 
Imminent Bt maize cultivation in the vicinity 
GMO-free zones understand themselves as the most efficient measure to guarantee long-term 
GMO-free farming (Nischwitz et al., 2005). We therefore assume that the development of 
GMO-free zones is also driven by the potential threat of GM crop cultivation in the vicinity. 
Since the cultivation of Bt maize has to be announced in a federal register at least three 
months prior to seeding, potentially affected farmers could react immediately to this threat by 
establishing a GMO-free zone. We therefore take the cultivation of Bt maize in the same year 
as another driving factor for the formation of a GMO-free zone. 
Farm size 
Coexistence  is  difficult  to  implement  in  small  structured  areas  (Consmüller  et  al.  2010). 
According to Cooper (2009), many German small farmers oppose to GM technology because 
they fear that pollen from nearby grown GM crops could outcross with their crops and reduce 
their  market  value.  Small  and  medium  sized  farms  are  beyond  that  also  organized  in 
associations which promote the establishment of GMO-free zones (Cooper, 2009). According 
to Beckmann and Schleyer (2007), actors can derive an economic benefit from a cooperative 
GMO-free  zone  if  participation  reduces  the  probability  of  lawsuits  among  neighbouring 
farmers. The risk of being involved in a law suit because of gene outcrossing due to GM crop 
cultivation  highly  depends  on  agricultural  structures,  such  as  small  farms.  We  therefore 
hypothesize that small farm structures favour the establishment of GMO-free zones because 
coexistence  between  production  forms  is  more  difficult  to  guarantee  and  there  is  a  high 
incentive for clustering to form a GMO-free zone.  
Tourism 
Since only 22% of the German population would support GM food (Eurobarometer, 2010), 
different actor groups have time and again emphasized the potential negative influence of GM 
crop cultivation on local tourism. Tourism can thus be perceived as a regional service whose  
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provision is favoured by the establishment of a cooperative GMO-free region (Jank et al., 
2006). We therefore assume that local actors engage in the establishment of GMO-free zones 
if the region already has a high touristic attractiveness or if actors assume that the touristic 
attractiveness of a region can be increased by this measure.  
Category III: Reduced costs of collective action 
Support by external stakeholders 
Not  only  increasing  benefits  can  favour  the  establishment  of  GMO-free  zones  but  also 
reduced costs. Since a cooperative GMO-free zone comes into being through cost-intensive 
collective  action,  we  assume  that  also  cost-reducing  factors  might  lead  to  a  successful 
foundation of a GMO-free zone. Consmüller et al. (2010) found a negative effect of anti-
GMO-activists,  namely  members  of  Friends  of  the  Earth  Germany  (BUND)  on  regional 
adoption  of  Bt  maize.  The  German  platform  on  GMO-free  zones  (www.gentechnikfreie-
regionen.de) is jointly organized by BUND and the Consortium on Rural Agriculture (AbL, 
Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft). They actively support the establishment of 
cooperative GMO-free zones by providing information and guidance through their website. 
Nischwitz  et  al.  (2005)  report  regionally  different  engagements  of  local  farmers’  unions 
(Landesbauernverbände) in relation to the  establishment of GMO-free  zones. The authors 
report, that in Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg, most GMO-free zones were fundamentally 
supported by the farmers’ union. Such an engagement could not be observed in the Northern 
and Eastern parts of Germany. Taking all aspects together, we assume that a high regional 
incidence  of  anti-GMO  activists  can  positively  influence  the  establishment  of  GMO-free 
zones for the following reason: They can make use of existing infrastructures to coordinate 
the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  GMO-free  zones  and  thus  reduce  the  costs  of 
cooperation,  e.g.  through  internet  platforms  and  their  knowledge  on  how  to  mobilize  the 
public (see also Cooper, 2009). Due to a lack of data, we have to confine our analysis to the 
number of BUND members as an indicator for reducing the costs of collective action.  
5  Data and econometric model 
The previous hypotheses were tested by using a panel dataset at the federal state level. This 
database includes regionally aggregated information about the area under GMO-free zones 
and  various  structural  and  socioeconomic  variables  for  the  years  2004  to  2007.
2  Data  on 
GMO-free  zones  was  taken  from  the  corresponding  website  (www.gentechnikfreie-
regionen.de). Data on ECB infested area is taken from Deutscher Bundestag (2006). Data on 
agricultural area under Bt maize cultivation was obtained from the public site register at the 
Federal Agency for Consumer Protection and Food Safety (Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz 
und Lebensmittelsicherheit). Data on BUND members are taken from the annual reports of 
the association. All other data are official statistics provided by federal and state statistical 
offices.  Descriptive  statistics  are  summarised  in  Fehler!  Verweisquelle  konnte  nicht 
gefunden werden.. 
                                                 
2 The city states Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg were omitted from the analysis. 10 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable name  Mean  Std. dev.  Min  Max 
GMO-free zones (thousand ha)  90.7  199.8  0.0  846.8 
ECB infested area (thousand ha in 2005)  28.7  47.0  0.0  180.0 
Bt maize cultivation (ha)  76.4  224.8  0.0  1346.8 
Average farm size (ha)  97.2  84.7  22.9  263.7 
Maize area per farm (ha)  7.6  6.1  0.9  20.5 
Organic farming area (thousand ha)  62.1  42.4  5.2  146.5 
Arriving tourists (million persons)  9.1  6.5  0.7  26.4 
BUND members (thousand persons)  27.4  45.4  1.1  171.0 
N  52   
Notes:  Data covers years from 2004–2007. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations based on sources given in the text. 
We test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section, by using a linear regression model: 
,     1, , ,    1, , . it it it y x i N t T b e ¢ = + = = K K ,  (1) 
where  it y  is hectares under GMO-free zones for given regions and years,  it x  is a vector of 
determinants,  b  the vector of coefficients that is to be estimated, and  it e  a conventional, 
identically and independently distributed error term. Estimated confidence intervals for  b  
allow to statistically test the above hypotheses. N is the number of regions and T the number 
of years.  
Among the explanatory variables, the ECB infestation rate is an important factors determining 
the private benefits of Bt maize cultivation. Unfortunately, systematic and complete annual 
data on ECB infestation rates is missing. At the federal states level, the Federal Government 
of Germany provided information on infestation rates only for the year 2005. This indicator 
displays the area of maize in ha on which at least 10% of the plants are infested by the ECB. 
For the variable organic farming area, farm size and maize area per farm, data for 2004 and 
2006 was not available and was thus linearly interpolated from 2003, 2005 and 2007. As an 
indicator of the strength of the anti-GMO movement we use the absolute number of BUND 
members. 
Estimating consistent parameters in equation (1) raises a number of methodological problems. 
First, the various states differ considerably with regard to the absolute area of GMO-free 
zones. One reason may be the principal differences in utilized agricultural area per state. 
Furthermore, there might be important latent variables that have an impact on  it y , such as 
regional differences in preferences for GM crop cultivation, or other unobserved abilities and 
preferences of farmers and citizens. Second, some variables in  it x  may not be independent of 
the establishment of GMO-free zones. Notably, this could be the case for BUND membership 
which might have increased in response to impending or actual Bt maize cultivation in a 
given region, together with or prior to the establishment of GMO-free zones. Both problems 
will make  it e  no longer independently distributed, so that estimates of  b  are inconsistent.  
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Furthermore, there are eight observations with zero GMO-free zones in the dataset, so that 
censoring may bias the results of a linear model. 
The latter of these concerns was addressed by estimating the regression model using a Tobit 
approach that takes censoring into account (Greene 2008, p. 871). However, the differences to 
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression were minimal. Furthermore, problems of size effects 
and latent heterogeneity were addressed by estimating a fixed effects version of equation (1). 
As a consequence,  b  captured only the effect of relative changes in  it x  on  it y , independent 
of  the  absolute  size  of  GMO-free  zones.  Effects  due  to  size  or  latent  preferences  are 
eliminated  in  this  way.  To  the  extent  that  they  were  time  invariant,  the  effects  of  all 
endogenous determinants of  it y  were also eliminated. In order to capture this benefit, we did 
not consider a random effects specification any further, because it assumes that unobserved 
effects are uncorrelated with the other right-hand variables (Greene 2008, p. 200). Due to the 
so-called  incidental  parameter  problem,  there  are  unresolved  methodological  issues  in 
estimating Tobit models that include fixed effects (Greene 2008, p. 882). We therefore did not 
address censoring and unobserved heterogeneity within one model. Furthermore, the time 
invariant variable ECB infestation rate was omitted in the fixed-effect model. Because it was 
highly correlated with the absolute number of BUND members (with a partial correlation 
coefficient of 0.963), problems of multicollinearity prevented us to include both variables at 
the same time in the OLS model. In order to control for changes in the overall environment 
that are identical for all regions, such as in per capita income or other macro variables, we 
also included year dummies in all models. 
6  Results 
In Table 2, we present estimation results for two models. Model A presents the results of a 
pooled OLS model with period effects, whereas model B represents a linear fixed-effects 
model that also takes possible regional and time effects into account. Results for the Tobit 
model are not shown, as the difference to model A was minimal. As shown by the R², both 
models can explain a substantial part of the variation in the dependent variable. 12 
Table 2: Regression estimates for GMO-free zones in the German federal states 
Explanatory variables  Pooled OLS 
(A) 
OLS with regional fixed effects  
(B) 
  Coefficient  p-value  Coefficient  p-value 
ECB infested area (thousand ha in 2005)  3.779  ***  0.001  -     
Bt maize cultivation (ha)  -0.017    0.427  0.026  **  0.037 
Average farm size (ha)  -0.339    0.108  0.228    0.614 
Maize area per farm (ha)  2.851    0.380  -5.133    0.200 
Organic farming area (thousand ha)  -0.101    0.754  0.898    0.287 
Arriving tourists (million persons)  3.113  **  0.038  26.131  **  0.021 
BUND members (thousand persons)  -      15.108    0.136 
Year = 2005 (dummy)  7.796    0.669  -9.960    0.387 
Year = 2006 (dummy)  23.882    0.246  0.415    0.964 
Year = 2007 (dummy)  27.909    0.240  -13.250    0.387 
Constant  -42.009  *  0.069  -595.517  **  0.046 
R²  0.948      (within) 0.713     
Notes:  Model (B) based on deviations from state averages. *, **, ***: significant at 10%, 5%, 1% level. (A) 
uses robust  standard errors, standard errors in (B) are robust to clustering in  groups. N=52 for all 
regressions. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
The results from the two models consistently demonstrate the importance of ECB infestation 
and  current  Bt  maize  cultivation  as  drivers  of  GMO-free  zones  expansion.  A  second 
significant factor is the number of arriving tourists. Note that this carries over to the fixed 
effects model B. This is evidence that the relationship is not the spurious result of a simple 
size effect, i.e. bigger states have bigger GMO-free zones and more tourists. It was rather the 
relative increase of visitors independent of its absolute level that had a significant impact on 
the  expansion  of  GMO-free  zones.  On  the  other  hand,  farm  structures  and  cultivation 
practices other than GMO use had little influence on the establishment of GMO-free zones. 
The effect of BUND membership turned out positive in model B, but did not pass the ten 
percent level of significance. The presence of anti-GMO activists as measured by this variable 
hence tends to have only a weak effect on the growth of GMO-free zones. 
7   Conclusions 
A first main result of the empirical investigation is that ECB occurrence tends to reinforce the 
establishment of GMO-free zones. At first glance, this finding contradicts the considerations 
of Beckmann and Schleyer (2007). The authors assumed that the formation of GMO-free 
zones was more likely in regions where the target pest pressure was of minor importance 
because under these circumstances, no economic incentives existed to switch to Bt maize 
cultivation.  Indeed,  this  might  have  been  the  case  in  the  early  stages  of  GMO-free  zone 
formation,  where  the  opportunity  costs  for  the  establishment  of  a  GMO-free  zone  were 
regarded as being low. Beyond that, cultivation of Bt maize was not yet an option because the  
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event received its approval for commercial cultivation in 2005. Since we also considered data 
from  those  years  where  Bt  maize  cultivation  was  already  legally  possible,  the  mere 
occurrence  of  the  target  pest  was  apparently  interpreted  by  local  actors  as  an  omen  for 
imminent  Bt  maize  cultivation  in  the  near  vicinity.  This  point  of  view  is  furthermore 
supported  by  the  significantly  positive  influence  of  actual  Bt  maize  cultivation  on  the 
establishment of GMO-free zones. According to our results, the cooperative establishment of 
GMO-free zones is not only a political statement but also a direct reaction to a perceived 
change in landscape use. Apparently, local actors try to halt undesired landscape change by 
collective action. This brings us to the question of economic drivers for this cost-intensive 
collective action. Initially, we assumed, as also supported by Beckmann and Schleyer (2007), 
that local actors derive economic benefits from collective action which outweigh the costs. 
GMO crop cultivation is costly in terms of coexistence measures. Especially in areas with a 
high percentage of organic farms and small scale agricultural structures, coexistence can turn 
out to be cost intensive (Messean et al., 2006). In this case, cooperation to form a GMO-free 
zone could be regarded as a cost-saving alternative. However, our analysis does not support 
this hypothesis, since neither the share of organic farms nor the average farm size appeared to 
have an influence on the regional formation of GMO-free zones. 
Our analysis reveals a positive influence of tourism on the regional establishment of GMO-
free zones. This relationship has not been investigated so far, although a positive influence 
has already been suggested by Jank et al., 2006. Beyond that, from time to time newspaper 
statements  point  at  the  fact  that  local  administrations  fear  a  negative  effect  on  regional 
touristic attractiveness if GM crops are cultivated (Frankfurter Neue Presse, 2011; MVRegio, 
2011). The effect can be interpreted in two ways: on the one hand, the establishment of a 
GMO-free zone could be regarded as a measure to attract more tourists to a certain region and 
thus to increase economic benefits for local stakeholders. Establishing a GMO-free zone can 
create a positive image  for local agriculture,  especially for regions which have  also been 
known for large scale agriculture, such as the former East German federal states. This is in 
line  with  the  considerations  of  Beckmann  and  Schleyer  (2007),  who  discuss  marketing 
advantages as one driving force for the formation of GMO-free zones.   
On the other hand, it could be argued that regions with a long tradition in tourism might fear 
to lose their attractiveness due to Bt maize cultivation. In this case, the formation of a GMO-
free zone can be interpreted as a measure to halt this development and to sustain existing 
economic benefit streams. This could be the case for those landscapes, where tourism has 
always been an important source of income (e.g. Southern Bavaria).  
In our theoretical considerations we assumed a significant influence of external stakeholders, 
mainly anti-GMO activists, on the establishment of GMO-free zones. In our analysis this 
parameter could only be empirically represented by Friends of the Earth Germany (BUND), 
since  data  on  other  relevant  stakeholders,  such  as  AbL  and  local  farmers’  unions  was 
unavailable. BUND actively engages in the dissemination of information about GMO-free 
zones  through  their  website.  They  also  provide  active  help  with  contract  design.  The 
provision of this kind of infrastructure was regarded as being helpful to reduce the costs of 
collective action and favour the establishment of GMO-free zones. Beyond that, Consmüller 
et al. (2010) could demonstrate a negative effect of BUND members on regional adoption of 
Bt  maize.  However,  our  empirical  analysis  only  indicates  a  significant  influence  of  this 
parameter at the 15% level. One explanation for this finding is that,  as we laid down in 
chapter 3, BUND members are by far not the only stakeholders active in the formation of 
GMO-free zones. Further investigations of this parameter should be carried out by taking the 
role of the AbL as well as the local farmers’ unions into account. GMO-free zones are likely 
to have a high support from the local community if their concerns are addressed by a variety 
of stakeholder groups which recruit their members from different sections of the population. 
BUND members are linked to the environmental movement whereas AbL addresses small 14 
farms. Being able to rely on the farmers’ union for the establishment of GMO-free zones also 
seems to be very effective especially in those areas where many farmers hold a membership 
and the farmers’ union has a good standing in the local community. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that the imminent or actual expansion of GM crops in a certain 
region was an important driver of the creation of GMO-free zones in this region. To the extent 
that this can be identified by a regionally aggregate empirical analysis, the previous factor 
appears to dominate more farm-specific determinants influencing the costs of uncertainty and 
coexistence. This finding is consistent with the view that it is more the overall rejection of 
agro-biotechnology by broad strata of the population, including stakeholders in tourism and 
environmental  protection,  than  economic  benefits  at  the  farm  level  which  make  German 
regions establish GMO-free zones. 
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